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Monday, July 27, 2020 | History

9 edition of The political economy of central-bank independence found in the catalog.

The political economy of central-bank independence

by Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger

  • 347 Want to read
  • 1 Currently reading

Published by International Finance Section, Dept. of Economics, Princeton University in Princeton, N.J .
Written in English

    Subjects:
  • Banks and banking, Central

  • Edition Notes

    Includes bibliographical references (p. 70-77).

    StatementSylvester C.W. Eijffinger and Jakob de Haan.
    SeriesSpecial papers in international economics,, no. 19
    ContributionsHaan, Jakob de.
    Classifications
    LC ClassificationsHG1811 .E37 1996
    The Physical Object
    Pagination82 p. ;
    Number of Pages82
    ID Numbers
    Open LibraryOL977161M
    ISBN 10088165308X
    LC Control Number96014334

      The book is titled The Political Economy Of Central Banking and is composed of 23 essays on the role of the central bank in the economy. Joining me now to discuss his book .   Yet the main reason to revisit independence is the state of the world economy. Inflation has fallen steadily since the early s. Since the early s advanced economies have struggled at .

    The Political Economy of Monetary Union book. Towards the Euro. By Francesco Giordano, Sharda Persaud. Edition 1st Edition. First Published eBook Published 18 October Pub. location London. Imprint Routledge. In Bundesbank clothes: issues on central bank independence. central bank is unlikely to be an indicator of actual political independence for short periods of time, and it is even more unlikely for longer periods. The measures of central bank independence are too imprecise to represent a cardinal measure-of-independence variable that can be employed in a regression model (Cargill ).

    Crowe C. and Meade E., , Central Bank Independence and Transparency: Evolution and Effectiveness, European Journal of Political Economy, 24(4), Cukierman A., , Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policymaking Institutions: Past, Present and Future, European Journal of Political Economy, 24, The case for central bank independence, however, has gained ground elsewhere. Independent central banks are seen better at controlling inflation with a longer-term view of the economy than.


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The political economy of central-bank independence by Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger Download PDF EPUB FB2

The political economy of central bank independence 3 min read. In short, central bank independence is closely bound up with the rise to global pre-eminence of the financial sector. PDF | On Jan 1,King Banaian and others published On the Political Economy of Central Bank Independence | Find, read and cite all the research you need on ResearchGate.

Steinberg, S. Walter, in Handbook of Safeguarding Global Financial Stability, Central Bank Independence. CBI is very closely linked to exchange-rate politics because exchange rate and monetary policy are themselves tightly linked, and because independent central bankers are more sheltered from popular opposition to tight monetary policy or uncompetitive exchange rates.

Central bank independence (CBI) is usually understood as the central bank’s ability to control monetary instruments. On the other hand, CBI can also be seen as a set of restrictions on the government’s influence on the management of monetary policy by the central : Behrooz Gharleghi.

Central-bank independence relates to three areas in which the influence of government must be either excluded or drastically cur- tailed (Hasse, ): independence in personnel matters, financial.

C RITICS OF ECONOMICS like to say that its abstract theories lack real-world pay-offs. There is a glaring counter-example: the global rise of central-bank independence.

As the US economist Thomas Palley notes in a recent paper, central bank independence is a product of the neoliberal Chicago school of economics and aims The political economy of central-bank independence book advance neoliberal interests.

More. Posen, A. Why central bank independence does not cause low inflation: there is no institutional fix for politics. In Finance and the International Economy, vol. 7, ed. O’Brien. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar. Central bank independence: A political economy approach 1.

For recent discussions of the applicability of the New Zealand model to the British situation, for example, see Huw Richards, ‘Banking on Freedom’, Times Higher Education Supplement (16 Julyp. 40) and Will Hutton, ‘Taking Independence Out of Context’, The Guardian (30 Aug.p.

In short, central bank independence is closely bound up with the rise to global pre-eminence of the financial sector. The financial crisis of hardly advanced the cause of central bankers.

Independent central banks in the country after country, after having patted themselves on the back for having achieved “Great Moderation” in.

central-bank independence and political instability by using data provided by Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti () on the turnover rate of central-bank governors (TOR) for forty-three developing coun-tries over four periods (–59, –71, –79 and –89).

Proxies for political stability are the number of regular and irregular. This book examines competing claims about the political sources of macroeconomic policy and performance in a manner that allows us to evaluate the ways in which central bank independence and increased capital mobility structure the interaction between political goals.

Controlling the amount of money in the economy allows the government to directly influence the economy. Central Banks. Most governments have a central bank that controls monetary policy.

In the United States, the central bank is called the Federal Reserve Bank (also known simply as the Fed).

The powers that central banks have vary from state. Capitalism, Not Globalism: Capital Mobility, Central Bank Independence, and the Political Control of the Economy (Michigan Studies In International Political Economy) [Clark, William Roberts] on *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers.

Capitalism, Not Globalism: Capital Mobility, Central Bank Independence, and the Political Control of the Economy (Michigan Studies Author: William Roberts Clark.

Cukierman, A (), Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Eijffinger, S C W and J De Haan (), “The political economy of central bank independence”, Special Papers in International Economics No.

19, Princeton, NJ. The consensus that surrounded the granting of central bank independence in the pursuit of a price stability oriented monetary policy has been challenged in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, in the light of the rise of populism on the one hand and the expanded mandates of central banks on the other hand.

After considering the economic case for independence and the three Ds. The Myth of Independence traces the Fed’s transformation from a weak, secretive, and decentralized institution in to a remarkably transparent central bank a century later.

Offering a unique account of Congress’s role in steering this evolution, Sarah Binder and Mark Spindel explore the Fed’s past, present, and future and challenge Reviews: 3. The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence and the Challenges for Development in African Economies.

23 Pages Posted: 20 Jul This paper surveys the pros and cons of Central Bank Independence and how it could help set developing economies on the path of steady growth. The research develops a theoretical framework for the.

history: “The Balance of Power: The Political Fight for an Independent Central Bank, Present.” The European Central Bank explains its political independence. Get this from a library. The political economy of inflation and central bank independence. [Berthold Herrendorf; Manfred J M Neumann; Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain)].

Additional Physical Format: Online version: Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W. Political economy of central-bank independence. Princeton, N.J.: International Finance Section. "Central Bank Independence Revisited: After the financial crisis, what should a model central bank look like?" Page 2.

Accessed June 7, Pimco. "The Downside of Central Bank Independence.Downloadable! The theory of independence of central banks was developed during the s and s. Central banks went from private joint-stock company to public entity with special legal status in the long-term.

Today the topic of independence is one of the most popular in the political economy. In the s, researches moved in two directions: the impact of independence on sovereign debt.